Abstract-The state-of-the-art federated learning brings a new direction for the data privacy protection of mobile crowdsensing machine learning applications. However, besides being vulnerable to GAN based user data construction attack, the existing gradient descent based federate learning schemes are lack of consideration for how to preserve the model privacy. In this paper, we propose a secret sharing based federated extreme boosting learning framework (FedXGB) to achieve privacy-preserving model training for mobile crowdsensing. First, a series of protocols are designed to implement privacy-preserving extreme gradient boosting of classification and regression tree. The protocols preserve the user data privacy protection feature of federated learning that XGBoost is trained without revealing plaintext user data. Then, in consideration of the high commercial value of a well-trained model, a secure prediction protocol is developed to protect the model privacy for the crowdsensing sponsor. Additionally, we operate comprehensive theoretical analysis and extensive experiments to evaluate the security, effectiveness and efficiency of FedXGB. The results show that FedXGB is secure in the honest-but-curious model, and attains approximate accuracy and convergence rate with the original model in low runtime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Extreme gradient boosting learning (XGBoost) is one of the most state-of-the-art machine learning model that performs noticeably well on processing both classification and regression tasks in applications, like malware detection [1] and consumption behaviour prediction [2] . Its success is mainly due to its excellent predictive performance, highly optimized multicore, mature distributed implementation and the ability to handle sparse data [3] . However, just like the other machine learning models, its high performance is still based on the support of large-scale database. Building a reliable big database usually requires the professional data analyst to collect and analyze tens of years statistic data, whose cost is unaffordable for most companies [4] . Thus, mobile crowdsensing which implements data collection tasks through volunteers becomes popular in real-world applications. One of the most representative examples is the crowdsening based smart recommendation service for news app [5] .
For the existing mobile crowdsensing architecture, two drawbacks are hindering its further development. One is the limited computation power and storage space of the central cloud server [6] . To resolve it, an ideal countermeasure is distributed learning, yet in the framework, data are usually owned by different parties. The high-level parties (e.g. service provider) always collect user private data (e.g. age, income or address) under the pretext of training machine learning model and improving user experience. From the data security incidents of recent years, the damages caused by this type of privacy leakage have not been only towards individual security or company finance, but also expanded to the national future. For example, in 2018, the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data incident reveals the big IT company's secret harvest of millions of people's personal data to sway the country's leadership election [7] . Consequently, how to preserve data privacy for the distributed learning of mobile crowdsensing becomes the other obstacle required to overcome. Towards the above challenges, federated learning, which groups the distributed devices and remote cloud servers into a loose federation and allows model training with no original user data uploaded, is proposed [8] .
Nevertheless, for current federated learning architectures, there are three serious but unattended problems.
Model Privacy. A well-trained model is the product of massive investment. An example is that, to develop highperformance machine learning and deep learning models, Google pays $162 millions for "DeepMind" in 2016 1 . Existing federated learning schemes usually choose to publish newly obtained model to users or third-party cloud platforms to continue the next round of training [9] . This means the trained model can be stolen by users with very little expense, like only some computation power and registration cost. And the victim companies may lose the investment in model training because of model privacy leakage.
User Dropout. As the mobile crowdsensing based online learning framework, one of the most prominent features is the instability of users. During any stage of each learning round, there is a great chance that user dropout occurs. For the original federated learning framework [8] and other follow-up researches [10] , the condition is not taken into full consideration. Their default assumption that all users can maintain completely steady connections may make them unpractical in applications.
Data Reconstruction Attack. Recent researches point out that the federated learning schemes are vulnerable to GAN based user data reconstruction attack [11] . The attack allows the malicious server to exploit the gradient aggregation results uploaded by users, which are originally used for model updating, to derive user data with GAN.
To address the mentioned challenges, in this paper, we propose a secret sharing based federated extreme boosting learning framework (FedXGB) to achieve privacy-preserving model training for crowdsensing applications. The main contributions of FedXGB are listed as follows.
• Extreme Boosting Privately. The privacy-preserving federated extreme gradient boosting learning architecture, FedXGB, achieves efficiently training of XGBoost model for mobile crowdsensing without revealing user private data to servers.
• Model privacy preservation. Considering the high commercial value of the well-trained model in applications, FedXGB develops a privacy-preserving prediction protocol that allows the model inference operated with key parameters in the encrypted format.
• Robustness against dynamic user change. In FedXGB, a full countermeasure against user dropout is proposed, which minimums the cost lost and reserve as much efficiency as possible.
• Provable security and low performance loss. Comprehensive security analysis is operated to prove the secure of FedXGB in the honest-but-curious model. And extensive experiments are operated to confirm that FedXGB has negligible accuracy loss and high efficiency.
II. PRELIMINARY

A. Notations
Some frequently-used notations of the paper are summarized in Table I.   TABLE I  NOTATION TABLE   Notation  Description  l(·) an arbitrary loss function with second-order derivative g i the first-order derivative of l(·) h i the second-order derivative of l(·) ζu the secret share distributed to the user u Ru the secret mask set owned by the user u F a finite field F , e.g. Fp = Zp for some large prime p f k the CART obtained from the k-th iteration of XGBoost · u keys of u for signature, encryption or secret mask generation
B. Extreme Boosting Learning
Extreme boosting learning (XGBoost) is one of the most outstanding ensemble learning methods because of its excellent performance in processing regression, classification, and Kaggle tasks [12] . An XGBoost model is composed of multiple classification and regression trees (CARTs), which are trained by the gradient boosting method. For the k-th iteration, the objective of the XGBoost is to minimize,
where n is the total number of training samples, i is the index of each sample, and y i is the label of the i-th sample.ŷ
represents the predicted label of the i-th sample at the (k − 1)-th iteration. Ω is a regularization item to avoid the over-fitting issue, which can be expanded as:
where γ and λ are two constant values. T is the number of tree leaves and ω j represents the weight of leaf j. After the expansion of Ω and the use of second-order Taylor approximation, the scoring functionL k (f k ) to measure the quality of f k is displayed as:
where I j represents the set of training samples. According to the score functionL k , we can retrieve an optimal tree for the k-th iteration.
C. Secret Sharing
Since attackers can easily derive users' private data by exploiting the uploaded gradients [11] , the (t, n) Secret Sharing (SS) scheme [13] is adopted in our scheme. For the (t, n) SS scheme, a secret s is allowed to be split into n shares. s can be recovered only if at least t random shares are provided; otherwise, it cannot be obtained. The share generation algorithm is illustrated as SS.share(s, t, n) = {(u, ζ u )|u ∈ U}, in which n represents the number of participants involved in SS and U = {1, 2, , ..., n} is the set of participants. ζ u describes the share for each user u. To recover each secret, the Lagrange polynomials based SS.recon({(u, [ζ] u )|u ∈ U }, t) is used. It is required that U ⊆ U has to contain at least t participants. The following is a previously proposed secret sharing protocol [14] to fulfill secure comparison in FEDXGB.
• Secure Comparison Protocol (SecCmp) [14] : Given two sets of secret shares, SS.Share(s 1 , t, n) = {(u, ζ 1 u )|u ∈ U} and SS.Share(s 2 , t, n) = {(u, ζ 2 u )|u ∈ U}, random shares of the comparison result SS.Share(s, t, n) = {(u, ζ u )|u ∈ U } is generated. Having at least t shares, i.e., |U | > t, the secret can be recovered. If s 1 > s 2 , SS.Recon({(u, ζ u )|u ∈ U }, t) = 0; otherwise, SS.Recon({(u, ζ u )|u ∈ U }, t) = 1.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce the learning framework of secret sharing based federated extreme boosting FEDXGB, illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
} is a set of users belonging to the same domain. Users are data generators and volunteer to participate in the crowdsensing model training for FEDXGB.
Edge Servers. E = {e 1 , e 2 , ..., e θ }, where e i ∈ E is an edge server. Edge servers are provided by various operators. Each edge server provides the communication service for the users that belong to the domain it controls. In FEDXGB, E aggregates gradients and uploads results to S.
Central Cloud Server. According to the aggregation results uploaded by E, S trains the model without knowing users' private data. The trained model only belongs to S, not publicly accessible.
B. Security Model
In FEDXGB, we use the curious-but-honest model as our standard security model. The definition of the adversary A in the security model is formalized as follows: Definition 1 [15] . In a communication protocol, a legitimate participant, A, does not deviate from the defined protocol, but attempts to learn all possible information from the legitimately received messages.
Any u ∈ U, e ∈ E and S can be an A with the following abilities: 1) corrupt or collude with at most t legitimate participants and get their inputs; 2) cannot extract the information from the other good parties (e.g., legitimate inputs, random seeds); 3) have limit computing power to launch attacks. FEDXGB is required to achieve the two requirements.
• Data Privacy. e ∈ E and S are unable to learn the private data of any u ∈ U, especially by the data reconstruction.
• Model Privacy. u ∈ U and e ∈ E are unable to learn the key model parameters owned by S.
IV. FEDERATED EXTREME BOOSTING LEARNING
In the section, we discuss implementation details of FEDXGB. The basic idea of FEDXGB to preserve privacy is to implement the extreme CART boosting of XGBoost without requiring any users' private data. And the building of CART is implemented by invoking the federate extreme gradient boosting protocol (SecBoost). During the CART building process, an essential operation is finding the optimal split. To achieve privacy-preserving split finding, we propose the secure split finding protocol (SecFind). Additionally, the secure prediction protocol (SecPred) is designed to obtain prediction results of the newly obtained CART without model privacy disclosure. Finally, we discuss the robustness of FEDXGB against user dropout in real-world applications.
A. Cryptographic Definition
Prior to introducing the details of FEDXGB, two essential cryptographic functions are defined firstly.
1) Key Agreement: We apply three algorithms for key agreement in FEDXGB: key setup KEY.Set, key generation KEY.Gen, and key agreement KEY.Agr. Specifically, the key setup algorithm, KEY.Set( ), is for setting up a public parameter p pub . is a security parameter that defines the field size of a secret sharing scheme F p . KEY.Set( ) outputs a quaternion p pub ← (G, p, g, H). G is an additive cyclic group with a large prime order p and a generator g. Consider two arbitrary users, u and v, u first applies the key generation algorithm KEY.Gen(p pub ) to generate outputs k pri u ← x u and k pub u ← g xu , which compose a private-public key pair
, which is shared with v. 2) Identity Based Encryption and Signature: To ensure secure data transmission in FEDXGB, we applied an identity based encryption algorithm and a signature algorithm for message encryption and identity verification, respectively. Given a key pair ( ek enc , ek dec ) ←KEY.Gen or a share key ek enc = ek dec ←KEY.Agr, the encryption function IDE.Enc outputs c =IDE.Enc( ek enc , t). And the decryption function IDE.Dec recover the plaintext t by computing t =IDE.Dec( ek dec , c). Similarly, the signature algorithms, SIG.Sign and SIG.Verf, are defined. Given the key pair for signature ( k sig , k ver ) ←KEY.Gen, SIG.Sign outputs the signature σ =SIG.Sign ( k sig , t). If SIG.Verf( k ver , t, σ) = 1, σ is proved to be valid; otherwise, σ is invalid.
B. Secure Boosting
SecBoost completes the privacy-preserving extreme gradient boosting process as shown in Protocol 1. In the protocol, all users are orderly labeled with unique indexes 1, 2, ..., n to identify their identities. Each of users deploys a small local dataset D u = {(x u,1 , y u,1 ), (x u,2 , y u,2 ), ...}. Note that we briefly describe the situation of sending a message M from A to B as A ⇒ B : M . And the data exchange between users from different domains needs edge servers to serve as communication bridge. The overview of SecBoost is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Steps are proceeded in detail as below.
Step 1. System Setup: U, E, and S setup public parameters for key generation and model training. Firstly, apply Step 2. User Selection: To minimize the cost of recovering lost data for dropout users, SecBoost selects the more active users to participate in the subsequent model training process. The selection is based on some manually defined standards such as the keeping active time, the connection stability, and the maximum number of users. The set of selected users are expressed as U ⊂ U. Based on U , the number of total users |U j | = n j and the secret sharing threshold t j are determined. The legitimacy of selected users is verified by confirming whether their signature for key distribution is valid.
Step 3. Secret Mask Collection: In the step, the secret masks for masking the sub-aggregation of the first-order and second-order gradients are generated. The masks are random shares of the mask key from different users. Each user generates random shares of its own mask key by computing {(u, ζ 
Step 4. Boosting: Assume that the feature set of the training samples is Q = {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α q }. For boosting, S randomly selects a sub-sample Q ⊂ Q, and invokes SecFind(Q , U , E{(u, R u )} u∈U0 ) to find the optimal split. The implementation detail of SecFind is given in Section IV-C. To build a new boosting tree with an optimal structure, S has to successively operate the boosting process until the current tree depth reaches d max or other termination conditions [16] are met. Finally, SecBoost the newly fulfilled tree as f κ . Moreover, each user updates the value ofŷ for the new round of training after receiving the newly constructed CART. For the privacy of both user data and training model, the prediction is completed by invoking SecPred whose details are given in Section IV-D. By repeatedly invoking SecBoost, we can get a trained XGBoost model
Here, K is the naximum training round, and K is a functional space corresponding to all possible CART.
Protocol 1 Federated Extreme Gradient Boosting Tree Building (SecBoost)
Input: A central server S, a set of users U = {u 1 , ..., u θ } and a trusted third party T . Output: A well-trained CART. 1: Step 1: S selects security parameter p pub ←KEY.Set( ) and publishes the parameters for model training
Step 2: e j ∈ E selects proper active user set U j , secret sharing threshold t j and operates e j ⇒ U j : (U j , t j ).
Step 3: u ∈ U j computes the shares of shared key sk
Step 4: S randomly selects a feature sub-sample Q from full feature set Q. 12: S invokes SecFind(Q , U , E, {(u, R u )} u∈U ) to determine the current optimal split. 13: Repeat Step 3 until reaching the termination condition.
C. Secure Split Finding
The most important operation in XGBoost is to optimize the tree structure by finding the optimal split for each node of each CART. For the centralized training method, XGBoost achieves the split finding by simply sorting the feature values of training sample, and then, traversing the values to find the optimal split [16] . For FEDXGB, the training data are distributed on different users. While applying the above optimal split finding algorithm, it has to invoke SecCmp for multiple times (e.g. O(nlogn) for quick-sort algorithm) to achieve the same goal. Therefore, we propose a novel distributed split finding algorithm, listed in Protocol 2.
To find an optimal split, SecFind takes as input all candidate features A, the user set U, the edge server set E, and the secret mask{(u, R u )} u∈Ui , and then takes the following steps. First, e j ∈ E informs the users in its domain to upload their sub-aggregations of all first-order and secondorder gradients, g k and h k , mentioned in Eq.3. Each subaggregation is masked with random shares of the mask key ζ sk u,v and a random value r u , where u, v ∈ U j . Then, e j Protocol 2 Secure Split Finding (SecFind) Input: All candidate features A = {α 1 , α 2 , ..., α δ }, the user set U = {U 1 , U 2 , ..., U θ }, the edge server set E, the secret mask
The optimal split for feature α and its score.
1:
Each u ∈ U j generates a random value r u and its random shares {(u, ζ r u,v )|v ∈ U j } ←SS.share(r u , t, n).
3:
u ⇒ e j ⇒ v : c u,v ←IDE.Enc( ek share u,v , u||v||ζ r u,v ).
4:
Each
16:
u ⇒ e j : c u,ej ←IDE.Enc( ek
17:
H+λ ). 20: end for 21: return the split with maximum score. sums all masked sub-aggregations and transmits the result to S in the encrypted format. Having the encrypted values from edge servers E, S decrypts those values and computes the aggregation result. For each given candidate feature α i ∈ A, S finally selects all possible candidate splits and publishes them to E and U. Next, SecFind repeats the above steps to get the left-child node gradient sums for each candidate split. The sum results are used to compute the score for each candidate split according to Eq. 4. As the iteration is terminated, SecFind outputs the split with maximum score. The encryption and decryption keys in Protocol 2 are generated by invoking ek
D. Model Privacy Protection with Secure Prediction
For existing federated learning schemes, an indispensable operation is to refresh each user's local model at the end of each round of training [8] . The refreshed model is used for obtaining prediction results to update theŷ k−1 i in Eq. 1 that are essential to the next round of training. However, users are honest-but-curious entities. They potentially steal the model information to benifit themselves (e.g. sell the model to the competitors of S). To prevent the privacy leakage, we provide an optional security service in FEDXGB to protect the privacy of models. Instead of transmitting the newly generated CART model in plaintext, FEDXGB executes a lightweight secret sharing protocol SecPred, presented in Protocol 3, to proceed the prediction.
In SecPred, S takes a CART as input and U takes as input the weights of leaf nodes in the CART. S and U secretly and separately send the shared model parameters (optimal split for each node) and user data to edge servers. Then, E executes SecCmp and returns the comparison results to the corresponding user. Finally, U decides the leaf node for each sample based on the comparison results and collects prediction results. In this way, we guarantee nodes of the CART are unable to be accessed by U and E.
E. Robustness Against User Dropping Out.
In FEDXGB, the problem of user dropping out (UDO) might happen during the model training process. It is categorized into the following three cases. The feasibility of the countermeasures to UDO is based on the incremental learning, an online learning method supported by XGBoost [16] .
Case 1: A user u 0 drops out at the Step 1 or Step 2 of Protocol 1. Thus, E cannot receive messages from u 0 anymore. In such case, E just refuses u 0 to be involved in Protocol 3 Secure Prediction for a CART (SecPred) Input: S gets the thresholds for all split points of the input CART {ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 , ..., ϑ n }; U gets leaf node weights of the input CART. Output: The prediction result.
S computes {(e, ζ 1 e )|e ∈ E} ←SS.Share (ϑ i , t E , |E|) and sends them to the corresponding edge server. 3: for each u ∈ U do 4: Select the feature values Ω u = { 1 , 2 , ...} corresponding to ϑ i .
5:
Compute {(e, ζ 2 e,u )|e ∈ E} ← SS.Share ( ∈ Ω u , t E , |E|) and send to the corresponding edge server, where ∈ Ω u . E invokes SecCmp({(e, ζ 1 e )|e ∈ E}, {(e, ζ 2 e,u )|e ∈ E}) and forwards corresponding results to u. 8: end for 9: Based on the results, u ∈ U determines the leaf node and obtain prediction results.
the current round of training and replaces the user by another active user if possible. Case 2: A user u 0 drops out during the split finding process. E recovers the secret mask of u 0 by calling SS.Recon and removes u 0 from U if u 0 does not reconnect before the next round of computation, that is, U ⊆ U and u 0 ∈ (U \ U ). To recover the secret value of u 0 , E first collects the secret shares from at least t users ζ , the aggregation result for U is retrieved [17] . Case 3: A user u 0 drops out at the prediction step. E directly ignores the prediction request from u 0 and removes u 0 from the active user set at the next round of training.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The FedXGB security is determined by three protocols, SecFind and SecBoost and SecPred. To prove their security, we first give the formal definition of security for secret sharing protocol Definition 2 [18] and an essential theorem Theorem 1 proved to be secure in [14] . Definition 2. We say that a protocol π is secure if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator ξ that can generate a view for the adversary A in the real world and the view is computationally indistinguishable from its real view. Theorem 1. The protocols SecCmp is secure in the honestbut-curious security model.
Since the security of SecPred is only related to SecCmp, we omit its security proof which has been given in [14] . The security of SecFind and SecBoost is proved as follows. Theorem 2. The protocol SecFind is secure in the honestbut-curious security model. proof. Denote the views of user and edge server as V u = {view u1 , ..., view u δ } and V e = {view e1 , ..., view e θ }. From the operation process of SecFind, we can derive view ej = {ζ
where 1 ≤ j ≤ θ, u ∈ U j , v ∈ U j and u = v. Based on Theorem 1, it can be discovered that, except the public parameter, the elements belonging to view u k , view E and view S are all uniformly random shares. According to Shamir's secret sharing theory, the shares can be simulated by randomly chosen values from F p . Consequently, there exists a simulator ξ that can generate indistinguishable simulated view from the real view of SecFind. Then, it is derived that the protocol is secure according to the Definition 1, and Theorem 2 is hold. Theorem 3. The protocol SecBoost is secure in the honestbut-curious security model. proof. In the protocol SecBoost, the user and edge server views denoted as V u = {view u1 , ..., view un } and V e = {view e1 , ..., view e θ }. From the protocol definition, only parts of users are selected for model training in SecBoost. The views of unselected users are set to be empty. The views of remaining users U ⊆ U are view u k = {k
And for the edge server and the cloud server, their views are view ej = {k
and view S are the views generated by SecFind. Except the cryptographic keys, ciphertext and signature which can be treated as random values, the remaining elements of view u k , view ej and view S are all random shares as mentioned in the security proof of Theorem 2. Thus, similarly, we can derive that view u k , view ej and view S are simulatable for the simulator ξ, and the simulated views cannot be distinguished in polynomial time by the adversary. Based on Definition 1, SecBoost is proved to be secure. Lemma 1. A protocol is perfectly simulatable if all its subprotocols are perfectly simulatable.
According to universal composibility theory given in Lemma 1 [19] and the above proofs, it is concluded that FedXGB is simulatable. Based on the formal definition of security in Definition 2, FedXGB is derived to be secure.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct several extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of FEDXGB.
A. Experiment Configuration
Environment. We utilized an Ubuntu 16.04 desktop, with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7920HQ CPU @3.10GHz and 64.00GB of RAM, to serve as our central server. Additionally, we set up ten desktops (Ubuntu 16.04) with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @3.00GHz and 8.00GB of RAM. By launching multiple processes, each of them simulates at most two edge servers. We also deployed 50 standard BeagleBone Black development boards, that runs Ubuntu 14.04, AM335 1GHz ARM and 512MB of RAM, to serve as crowdsensing users. Each of them simulates at most 20 users. The programs in the experiments are implemented in C++. OpenMP library [20] is used to accelerate the concurrent operations.
Dataset. We collected two datasets commonly applied on mobile apps, ADULT 2 and MNIST 3 , which contain 48k instances with 123 features and 70k instances with 784 features, respectively. The dataset of ADULT is for adult income prediction, i.e., binary classification, which provides 32k instances are training data and 16k instances are for testing. The dataset of MNIST is for handwriting digit classification, i.e., multiple classification, which divides the instances into 60k for training and 10k for testing.
Setup. We set up parameters in FEDXGB as, step size η = 0.3, minimum loss reduction γ = 0.1, regulation rate λ = 1.0, user number n = 300, maximum tree depth d max = 3, and edge server number θ = 10. We used Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman [21] over the NIST P-256 curve, composed with a SHA-256 hash, to fulfill key agreement,. Authenticated encryption is operated by 128-bit AES-GCM [22] . Given each dataset, we averagely assigned the instances to each user. User dropout is assumed to occur every 10 rounds of boosting in our experiment. that is, 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% of users are randomly selected to be disconnected at each 10 th round of training. Meanwhile, the same number of replacements are rearranged to substitute the lost users.
B. Effectiveness Analysis
To assess the effectiveness of FEDXGB, we computed the classification accuracy and loss by comparing FEDXGB and the non-federated XGBoost. The loss functions are the logistic regression for ADULT and the softmax for MNIST. Fig. 3 presents the accuracy and loss of each round of training in FEDXGB. More specific, Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) describe the accuracy and loss of ADULT, and Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(d) show the result of MNIST. Compared with XGBoost, FEDXGB only introduces the accuracy loss with less than 1%. Consider the user dropout rate increased from 0% to 30%, FEDXGB is robust against the user changes during online training.
C. Efficiency Analysis 1) Theoretically Analysis:
The theoretical analysis of computation cost for SecBoost, SecFind and SecPred in Table II . Represent |D| as the number of training instances. The computation costs of each user, each edge server and the central server for SecBoost are O(n/θ + (n/θ) · δd max |D|), O(n/θ + (n/θ) 2 · δd max |D|) and O(n + δθd max ). As shown in Protocol 1, SecBoost has four steps. Since the system setup stage can be operated offline, its computation and communications cost are ignored. The remaining three steps are divided into two parts. One part contains the second and third steps. In the part, each user executes 2(n/θ) key agreement, signature and encryption operations, which take O(n/θ) time. Each edge server executes n/θ signature operations, which 2 ADULT: https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ cjlin/libsvmtools/datasets/binary.html 3 MNIST: http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/ 2) Experiment Results: In order to further evaluate the efficiency of FEDXGB, we then experiment with the runtime and communication overhead under different user numbers and edge server numbers as shown in Fig. 4 . In the experiments, we set |D| = 50K and δ = 100.
Number of Users. When the involved users increase, the runtime for each user grows linearly, and inversely, the communication overhead for each user decreases, shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) , respectively. The linear growth of the runtime is caused by the incremental cost of user selection and secret mask collection steps. And due to the less samples distributed to each user, the communication overhead for each user decreases. The user dropout rate barely influences the runtime because the correlated active user only need to transmit one secret sharing for secret mask reconstruction. Considering the impact of the incremental user number performed on each edge server, the runtime for each edge server follows the quadratic growth, described in Fig. 4(c) . The data reconstruction for dropped users has the main effect on the increase of the runtime cost. Nonetheless, the communication overhead is barely influenced because only a little overhead increment is caused for the secret mask collection. The increase of client number can only bring a little more secret mask transmission overhead, yet the higher 
User
Edge Server Central Server user dropout always causes more time to reconstruct lost data via the time-consuming Lagrange polynomials. Specially, the central server deploys less computation tasks than edge server, but has more runtime as illustrated in Fig.4(e) . The phenomenon is caused by the reason that the central server has to wait for collecting every edge server's response to continue subsequent computation. The communication overhead plots about central server are omitted, because, for central server, its communication overhead is just the edge server number multiplied the difference between the edge server overhead and the user overhead.
Number of Edge Servers. When the involved edge servers increase, the runtime cost for each user decreases, illustrated in Fig. 4(f) . Because the number of user in each domain managed by each edge server reduces, the computational cost of secret sharing also becomes less for each user. Similarly, the runtime cost of each edge server decreases, Fig. 4 (g) while the computation of secret sharing assigned on each edge server reduces. As more edge servers are involved for computation, the communication overhead of each server decreases, shown in Fig. 4(h) . For each user, the communication overhead does not have obvious change because the assigned instances are static. And the cost of central server performs similar to Fig. 4 (e) with 300 users. Due to the space limitation, we omit these two plots in this paper.
In Table III , we list the runtime cost of different stages in FEDXGB. It indicates that the major overhead in FEDXGB is caused by the boosting stage, namely, the optimal split finding algorithm, because numerous loop operations are proceeded.
D. Defense Against User Data Reconstruction Attack
Reconstruction attack [6] , [11] is one of the most common and effective attacks against federated learning. Based on the generative adversarial networks (GAN), the attack reconstructs user data by solving an optimization problem. However, FEDXGB is protected against such GAN-based attack because the CART in FEDXGB partitions the input space into discrete regions and the optimization problem is unable to be resolved. In order to validate how well FEDXGB is protected, we conducted two experiments by launching the user data reconstruction (UDR) attack against the federated learning approach [8] and FEDXGB. We use the dataset of MNIST and the results are shown in Fig. 5 .
The left column of Fig. 5 illustrates that the federated learning approach is attacked successfully. The attacker (i.e., the central server), S, first collects the gradient aggregations uploaded by the specific victim ∇G v and other users ∇G i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Based on ∇G v and ∇G i , the attacker derives the representatives X i of the victim by solving the optimization problem Op = arg min ||∇G v − ∇G gen || 2 + Ω gen , where Ω gen is a regularization item and ∇G gen is the gradient of X i . Given X i , GAN outputs almost identical images.
The right column of Fig. 5 presents the UDR attack launched on FEDXGB. Suppose that ∇G i is the gradient aggregation obtained by an edge server e j , the attacker, e j , is unable to solve the optimization problem Op. Because of the discrete input, the optimizer can only advance towards random directions and outputs images that looks like random noises. And the gray-level frequency histograms in the last row of Fig.5 further illustrate that, for FEDXGB, UDR can hardly fit the features of original images. Most of the existing privacy-preserving works for machine learning are data driven and based traditional cryptographic algorithms. For example, Q. Wang et al. [23] proposed a privacy-preserving data mining model learning scheme for canonical correlation analysis in cross-media retrieval system garbled circuit. Z. Ma et al. [18] proposed a lightweight ensemble classification learning framework for the universal face recognition system by exploiting additive secret sharing. Considering the wide applications of gradient boosting decision tree (GDBT) in data mining, L. Zhao et al. [10] utilized the differential privacy technology to implement two novel privacy-preserving schemes for classification and regression tasks, respectively. And towards the patient's medical data privacy protection in e-Health system, X. Liu in [24] advocated a homomorphic encryption based scheme to implement privacypreserving reinforcement learning scheme for patient-centric dynamic treatment regimes. Due to be data security driven, the above four types of privacy-preserving schemes still have to upload encrypted user data to central server and cause massive extra communication overhead.
Therefore, the federated learning concept was proposed [8] . However, up to now, there were only a few works that adapted the architecture to propose practical schemes for applications [25] . And most existing federated learning schemes still concentrated on the SGD based models. For example, considering the limited bandwidth, precious storage and imperative privacy problem in modern Internet of Things (IoT) environment, S. Wang et al. provided a SGD based federated machine learning architecture based on the edge nodes in [6] . For the privacy-preserving machine learning model training in smart vehicles, S. Sumudu et al. [26] proposed a federated learning based novel joint transmit power and resource allocation approach. And to avoid the adversary to analyze the hidden information about user private data from the uploaded gradient values, cryptographic methods were then added to the original federated learning scheme for protecting gradients. B. Keith et al. [17] designed a universal and practical model aggregation scheme for mobile devices with secret sharing technology. In [27] , N. Richard et al. utilized the homomorphic encryption to protect the uploaded gradients and designed an entity resolution and federated learning framework.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving federated extreme boosting learning framework for crowdsensing applications. For securely building classification and regression forest in the extreme boosting way, we designed a series of secret sharing based protocols. The protocols guaranteed that the privacy of user data, learning gradients and model parameters were simultaneously preserved during the model training process of XGBoost. Moreover, comprehensive experiments were operated to evaluate the performance of FedXGB. Experiment results showed that, with FedXBG, we could let massive crowdsensing users work together to efficiently train a high-performance extreme boosting model with no need to concern about data privacy leakage.
